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Abstract
Reisig, Dawson, Bachelor of Arts, Spring 2016

Economics

An Empirical Analysis of Pull Factor Influences on EU Asylum Applications
Faculty Mentor: Ranjan Shrestha
As Europe continues to face the largest flood of immigration since World War II, the
foundational solidarity of the European Union (EU) is being severely strained under the burden
of allocating such a massive population influx and the subsequent issues resulting from complex
and divisive notions of national responsibility, cooperation, and integration. In struggling to find
a cooperative solution to this refugee crisis, a greater understanding of the destination country
characteristics that shape the asylum application preference would be highly beneficial for policy
makers and EU citizens. In examining the relative influences of these pull factors I implement a
fixed effects regression model in which I analyze the response of monthly asylum applications
over the period of 2008-2014 to differences in destination country characteristics such as income
opportunities, welfare benefits, the unemployment rate, the strength of various production
sectors, and the existing immigrant stock. In line with previous literature examining migration
preference, I find that network effects exert a strong upward pressure while the unemployment
rate exerts a downward pressure. However, my results show that a country’s welfare benefits
exert a statistically significant and stronger upward pressure than previously found. These
findings shed light on the lack of convergence in asylum applications as they indicate asylum
seekers are influenced by the economic conditions of destination countries, although historical
migration networks tend to play a larger role in the destination decision. As the pull factors I
found to be significant are difficult for policy makers to influence, my results suggest policy
makers should instead focus on EU-wide programs such as Tradable Immigration Quotas
(TIQ)’s, rather than decreasing a country’s relative attractiveness.
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A New Home: An Empirical Analysis of Pull Factor Influences on EU Asylum Applications
Introduction
In the years following 2011, widespread social unrest in Syria developed into sectarian
conflict and eventually a fully-fledged civil war, displacing entire populations as violence and
brutal persecution grew to encompass the area. Adding to the masses of refugees already fleeing
oppression in regions such as the Middle East and North Africa puts estimates at over one
million migrants entering the EU in 2015 alone (IOM, 2015); this practically unprecedented
volume of forced migration has put a severe strain on the institutional solidarity, infrastructure,
and security of the European Union. In stark contrast to attempts at alleviating the crisis through
refugee relocation programs and targeted aid stands a rising trend towards right-wing, antiimmigrant sentiment. Following the November 13th Paris attacks, countries are increasingly
calling for the reinstatement of national border controls due to concerns that the EU’s policy of a
border-free interior region is facilitating the travel of radicalized individuals (WSJ, 2015). While
there has long been a large distributional gap in asylum application rates, under this extreme
impetus various member states are enacting increasingly restrictive migration polices and
concentrating the blame of attracting high rates of refugees on the shoulders of countries such as
Germany for having overly-welcoming policies and too generous of a welfare state. Finding a
unified solution to this crisis is paramount to the survival of the EU’s foundational policy of
border-free travel, not to mention the humanitarian implications of improper action.
Boldly declaring his position on the importance of EU solidarity, Hungarian Prime
Minister Viktor Orban proclaims, “The problem is not a European problem. The problem is a
German problem. Nobody would like to stay in Hungary” (BBC, 2015). Regardless of whether
Mr. Orban’s assertion stems more from an analysis of asylum trends or an attempt to relieve his
country of humanitarian responsibility, the existing body of migratory research suggests asylum
seekers do prefer some countries over others. Once an asylum seeker has made the decision to
flee their home country, what shapes this preference? Specifically, what socioeconomic
characteristic is the most influential pull factor on an asylum seeker’s determination of the most
desirable EU destination country? Based on the findings of previous studies, the significant
determinants of migration inflows I will primarily focus on include: income opportunities, the
unemployment rate, welfare benefits, network effects, the recognition rate, and lastly, the
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strength of various production sectors (Neumayer, 2004; Hatton, 2009; Thielemann, 2004;
Mayda, 2005; Jimenez-Jimenez, 2014).

Asylum Policy History
In order to gain a good grasp on asylum application trends in the EU and the issues
stemming from them, it is necessary to have a brief understanding of its history of migration and
asylum policies. Fully established in 1995, the Schengen Area refers to the interior region of the
EU that is free of internal border controls and consists of common visa policies across all
member states, although it does maintain external border controls for those attempting to enter
into the Schengen Area. In creating a free-travel area for the purpose of international trade, its
goal was to facilitate the creation of a single European market (European Commission, 2010).
The second major policy advancement came in the form of rules implemented under the Dublin
Regulation, of which the most recent version was signed in 2013. The Dublin Rules deal directly
with asylum seekers, and establish policies regarding the determination of which EU member
state is responsible for processing an asylum application. Unless petitioned on the grounds of
having immediate family members in another EU country, the “country of first entry” rule states
that the first EU member country an asylum seeker sets foot in is responsible for processing their
claim of asylum. If a member state believes another EU country should have been liable for
processing a particular asylum claim, they can file an official Dublin Request in an attempt to
place the responsibility on the relevant EU member (UNHCR). As highlighted by issues
stemming from the current refugee crisis, the rules established under the Dublin Regulation have
been heavily criticized for placing an unfair burden on those exterior EU states.
An important introductory distinction to make is the difference in relative definitions
between an asylum seeker, a refugee, and a migrant. As defined by Amnesty International, a
refugee is “a person who has fled their country of origin and is unable or unwilling to return
because of a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of their race, religion, nationality, or
membership of a particular social group or political opinion” (Amnesty International, 2015). An
asylum seeker, then, is someone who is seeking international protection under claims of
persecution, but has yet to have their asylum application approved by the country to which it was
submitted, and so has not yet been officially recognized as a refugee. Finally, an immigrant is
simply a person who has relocated permanently to a foreign country; thus all asylum seekers
4

technically fall under the definition of immigrants, although an immigrant does not have to be an
asylum seeker as the term includes those economic migrants who have relocated purely to
improve their economic well-being. While I plan on incorporating the methodologies of some
migration flow studies into my framework (Mayda, 2005; Jimenez-Jimenez, 2013; De Giorgi and
Pellizzari, 2009), it is prudent to remember this distinction as asylum seekers tend to be under
much higher pressure to leave their origin country and thus would likely be less swayed by the
economic conditions of destination countries than those solely seeking a more prosperous
livelihood.
While the ongoing refugee crisis has dramatically highlighted the stark disparity of
asylum seeker burden-sharing within the EU, unequal rates of asylum application and refugee
recognition have been a persistent phenomenon. Examining relative asylum application shares
from the period of 1982-1999, Neumayer (2004) found differences as large as France and
Germany respectively receiving 20.8% and 15.7% of total EU asylum applications. This is
contrasted with countries such as Denmark and Spain, both receiving only 4.3% of total
applications, after normalizing by destination country population. Likewise, when comparing
the two time periods of 1997-2001 with 2001-2006, Hatton (2009) found that yearly
applications rose by roughly 50% in France, Austria, and Sweden, while falling by more than
50% in Germany, Hungary, and the Netherlands. Although some of the temporal single-country
application rate changes found can be explained by variation in source country push factors, the
opposite direction of trends in geographically proximate countries and the consistent discrepancy
of asylum application rates among EU member states suggest that an asylum seeker’s choice of
destination is influenced by the relative characteristics of possible receiving countries.
Compounding the issue of an unequal distribution of asylum applications is the persistent
lack of asylum policy harmonization seen in the substantial variation of refugee recognition rates
across the EU. Examining cross-country differences in recognition rates for 1999, Neumayer
(2005) found the success rates of Iraqi applications to be only about 10% in the Netherlands,
28% in Austria, 43% in Germany, and 83% in Denmark. As the integrity of the “country of first
entry” policy implemented under the Dublin Regulation is contingent upon the equal treatment
of asylum seekers, this lack of convergence in recognition rates undermines the goal of
facilitating a Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Previous studies have reached
conflicting conclusions about this variation, with interpretations ranging from it being the result
5

of free riding in the provision of a public good (Suhrke, 1998), to the more recent approach of
modelling it as a competitive regulatory game in which each country competes to minimize its
own refugee inflow (Barbou des Places and Deffains, 2004); however, a greater understanding of
recognition rate differences is not the primary purpose of this paper outside of the role this
variation plays in determining asylum seeker inflows. By viewing asylum seeker reception
standards and recognition rates as possible factors influencing the disparate distribution of
asylum application rates in the EU, a greater understanding of the largely unequal burden of
refugee protection faced by member states will hopefully be reached.

Literature Review
While numerous studies have already examined asylum application determinants, most of
the work done focuses on past trends ranging from the 1980’s to the early 2000’s. By combining
aspects of those previous studies and applying my framework to an updated dataset I hope to
extend the literature through a comprehensive empirical analysis of modern asylum application
trends in the EU. When comparing the economic state of pre-2000 Europe with more recent
conditions, it becomes obvious that there have been dramatic changes in many of the explanatory
variables found to be significant in previous studies. For example, following the European Debt
Crisis, unemployment rates skyrocketed in many EU countries with 2012 rates reaching over
24% in Spain and Greece, 10% in Poland, France, Italy, and Hungary; while conversely
remaining around 5% in countries such as Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands (Eurostat).
Additionally, developing regional turbulence has driven large shifts in asylum trends, with the
top five source countries of asylum seekers from 1982-2006 being Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraq,
Lebanon, and Serbia (Hatton, 2009); compared with the top five in 2015 being Syria,
Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, and Albania (BBC). Although Iraq and Afghanistan remain
consistent sources of asylum seekers, the war in Syria has dramatically increased overall
applications to EU member states and consequently reshaped asylum patterns and even policy.
Due to this almost unprecedented level of asylum applications, a more recent analysis of pull
factor influences would be highly beneficial to EU policymakers attempting to find a common
response the rapidly escalating crisis.

Models and Dependent Variables of Previous Studies
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Building off well-established models in the literature, I plan to use cross-country panel
data in regressing the monthly asylum application of EU-28 countries on a number of
theoretically important destination country characteristics. As done in Neumayer (2004), Hatton
(2009), and Mayda (2005), I will run a panel data regression, only using a fixed effects model
instead of the bilateral flows model done by Neumayer and Mayda. Benefiting greatly from the
recently established standards of data submission for EU member states reporting to Eurostat, I
will examine monthly asylum applications from 2008-2014. As migration data was submitted
under far looser guidelines in the form of a “gentleman’s agreement” prior to 2008, it often
resulted in incomplete and inconsistent data (DeWaard, 2012). By using Eurostat data from
2008-2014, I will have access to a more reliable dataset than those studies conducted prior to its
establishment. Due to it being a robust collection of data covering a wide variety of statistics, I
should be able to use Eurostat as the source of most of my explanatory variables.
Although my empirical analysis is aided by the existence of established methodologies
and access to more accurate data, there are a variety of complications that could potentially force
me to alter my planned framework. Using a monthly rate would require the controlling of
seasonal variation and it seems reasonable to expect a lag of at least a year in the decision of
application destination. Additionally, while previous studies have attempted to determine
methods of dealing with difficult to measure variables such as network effects and migration
policies, in some cases they may be imprecise or difficult to emulate.
In evaluating the response of migration flows to cross-country variations in pull factors, a
common method of controlling for origin country effects is to take the total number of asylum
seekers or emigrants from each origin country as a given, and then determine the relative annual
application rates for each destination country (Neumayer, 2004; Mayda, 2005) or the log number
of relative annual application rates (Hatton, 2009). As in my proposed model, a simpler method
of controlling for origin country effects is to utilize a fixed effects model in which dummy
variables are included for each time period, and comparisons are made within those time periods.
As done by Thielemann (2003) in his analysis of pull factor determinants, an additional
option for making wide-ranging asylum application quantities more comparable is to divide each
destination country’s yearly application rate by its population size and calculate a country’s
proportion based on the total number of asylum seekers, then divided by the total population of
all EU destination countries. Another possibility is to follow the framework of Jimenez7

Jimenez’s (2013) study of EU-15 migrant density in which her dependent variable was the
percentage of foreign citizens over the total population of an individual country in each year,
substituting asylum applications for foreign citizen stock in my regression. However, in using
this method there is the likelihood that I would pick up origin country effects, which would
require additional modifications to my proposed model.

Independent Variables of Previous Studies
For the assessment of my explanatory variables I will incorporate the methods found to
be successful in the existing literature, while in some cases making appropriate adjustments in
order to better suit my available dataset. In measuring labor market conditions such as GDP per
capita and the unemployment rate, I will follow the straightforward method of simply retrieving
the relevant panel data from Eurostat, with the possibility of taking the log of GDP per capita to
reduce distributional spread. While estimations of strength for those variables vary across the
literature, per capita income tends to be one of the most significant economic pull factors
(Neumayer, 2004; Thielemann, 2003). Similarly, Mayda (2005) found that a 10% increase in
GDP per worker implies a 19% increase in immigration rate. However, it is important to note
that she was investigating total migration flows instead of asylum trends, which would likely
cause her findings of economic pull factors to be more influential than those found in a study
purely investigating asylum application rates.
A third potential pull factor characterized by the economic conditions of possible
destination countries is the production structure of each individual country. In examining trends
of migrant density in the EU-15 from 2000-2010, Jimenez-Jimenez (2013) measured the strength
of the agriculture, industrial, and construction sectors by determining the relative percentages of
employment for each in every individual destination country. She found that high rates of
employment in both the agriculture and construction sectors attract migrants, while a greater
reliance on the industrial sector was associated with lower migration inflows. Although this
study was also investigating pull factors on total migration flows, and thus may have yielded
stronger results than what I will find, it was an inclusion I didn’t see anywhere in the literature
analyzing asylum application rates and it would be interesting to see if I find evidence of a
similar conclusion.
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Commonly found to be the most significant pull factor of migration inflows, network
effects based on a destination country’s existing immigrant stock are largely used in the
determination of the influence of historical ties between pairs of countries. While Neumayer
(2004) also included a variable measuring the number of years between 1900 and 1960 that an
origin country was a former colony of a destination country, most of the other literature has
found colonial and historical ties to be well instrumented for by measurements of existing
immigrant stock. In the bilateral flows model, the methodologies for capturing network effects
include Neumayer’s (2004) use of the average share of asylum seekers from each origin country
who applied to a destination country over the course of the previous two to five years, or
Hatton’s (2009) use of the total stock of immigrants from a given origin country in each
individual destination country.
Alternative to the bilateral flows model, Jimenez-Jimenez (2013) captured network
effects by including the log total of the foreign-born population for each destination country, and
found it to be the second most influential pull factor behind GDP per capita. Lastly, Thielemann
(2003) determined network effects by using a lagged variable measuring the stock of immigrants
from the top five asylum origin countries for each destination country, also finding it to be one of
his most significant explanatory variables. Combined, the conclusions reached by previous
studies suggest that asylum seekers place high importance on the presence of fellow countrymen
when determining a destination country, which is to be reasonably expected when faced with
forced migration under circumstances of fairly limited information.
Despite being a theoretically sensible inclusion among pull factor determinants, the
generosity of a country’s welfare benefits has typically been found to have low levels of
significance in past analyses. As there isn’t a reliable source of data for the assessing the level of
welfare benefits designed explicitly for asylum seekers, some measure of a country’s overall
welfare benefits is often used as a substitution. In specifically examining welfare-induced
migration stemming from EU enlargement, De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009) used the OECD’s
calculation of benefits by which they take the average wage of a manufacturing worker and
compute the amount of benefits that wage level is entitled to in the case of unemployment.
Although concluding that welfare distortions could potentially be large enough to distort the
benefits of a more mobile labor force, they found that increasing welfare benefits by one
standard deviation caused an increase in migration inflow equal to only 37% of what a congruent
9

increase in wages would cause. Similarly, Neumayer (2004) found his measure of welfare
benefits as general welfare expenditures relative to GDP to be insignificant. Even with these
results, it seems plausible that welfare benefits are still taken into consideration when making a
decision about potential destinations, and I feel it is prudent to include some metric of benefits in
my analysis as it has been well documented that immigrant households are more likely to receive
some type of welfare benefit when compared with native households (Borjas and Hilton, 1996;
Riphahn, 1998).
Exploiting the previously discussed lack of convergence in asylum recognition rates
across the EU, many studies have explored the relationship between an asylum applicant’s
likelihood of approval in a specific country and that country’s asylum application rates.
Measured in a variety of ways, the probability of asylum recognition and a country’s overall
migration policies have typically been found to exert a significant influence on migration
inflows. In evaluating the effect of a country’s recognition rate, Neumayer (2004) uses a lagged
variable of each destination’s total first-instance recognition rate for all asylum applicants. He
uses a lagged variable for the reasons of it being unlikely that an asylum seeker has information
on current-year recognition rates as well as to avoid potential endogeneity problems. Using this
measurement he found that a lower recognition rate is in fact associated with a lower asylum
application rate. In comparison, Hatton (2009) found the coefficient on total recognition rate to
be small and insignificant. Due to the fact that the probability of approval is likely to be an
influential factor in theory, he attributed this insignificance to endogeneity problems in his model
and instead instrumented for recognition rate using indices of three different dimensions of
policy consisting of measurements for ease of access, processing procedure, and asylum seeker
welfare. Focusing on the processing procedure indicator, he found that increases in the
likelihood of a country designating asylum claims as manifestly unfounded rather than granting a
form of subsidiary status resulted in an estimated 16% reduction in application rates for every 10
percentage point decrease in recognition rate. As Eurostat has data on total recognition rates, as
well as measurements of Dublin Requests and the number of immigrants refused at the border, I
plan on incorporating a variety of these variables in my model to reach a robust conclusion on
the effect of probability of approval.
Other studies have likewise implemented indices consisting of various measures of a
country’s policies toward immigrants and asylum seekers, such as Jimenez-Jimenez’s (2013)
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integration policy index and Thielemann’s (2003) asylum seeker deterrence index. Measuring
the extent to which a country’s law treats immigrants with the same rights as native citizens, the
use of MIPEX by Jimenez-Jimenez (2013) resulted in the finding that EU-15 countries with an
index value above the average tended to have higher concentrations of foreign populations. As
highlighted earlier, the fact that she was examining total immigration rather than the subset of
asylum seekers that I am analyzing could lead to different results, although the direction of
influence for this variable is likely to be the same. Specifically focusing on the effect of
deterrent policy measures on asylum seeker inflows, Thielemann (2003) created an index of
three dummy variables for whether a country had an applicant dispersal scheme, a non-cash
based system of benefits, and a prohibitive law preventing asylum seekers from working until
their claim has been approved. Based on this index, he found that deterrent policies are
significant in the negative direction, although they are not as influential as historic and economic
pull factors.

Policy Implications
Widely referred to throughout the literature as a “race to the bottom”, the trend of EU
member states attempting to reduce their relative attractiveness to asylum seekers through the
enactment of increasingly restrictive policy measures has led to varied conclusions throughout
the literature. As previously referred to, Barbou des Places and Deffains (2004) have modeled
this widespread spiral of restrictions in asylum legislation as a competitive regulatory game in
which countries were competing to provide as little protection as possible in an attempt to
decrease the escalating costs associated with a rapid influx of asylum seekers. However, others
such as Kvist (2004) in his analysis of a potential “race to the bottom” in setting welfare benefits
during a past EU enlargement have contended that similar decreases in benefit levels are the
result of individual labor market conditions rather than a strategic interaction among member
states. Despite these contentious views, it is my opinion that a “race to the bottom” is indeed
taking place, exemplified by the recent actions of numerous EU states such as the shuttling of
asylum seekers to alternative EU destinations, the recent erection of razor-wire fences in
Hungary and Slovenia, and the announcement that Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia
were no longer allowing in migrants unless they were from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq (WSJ,
2015).
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As an attempt to reduce the unequal burden of refugee protection in the EU and
internalize the positive externality of poverty alleviation, Moraga and Rapoport (2014) propose a
system of tradable immigration quotas (TIQs), in which a market is created where countries
could essentially pay other countries to accept their allotted proportion of asylum seekers. In
order to improve efficiency, they recommended supplementing the TIQ system with a matching
mechanism attempting to pair countries and immigrants based on specific preferences. In a
following paper, Moraga and Rapoport (2014) show that the creation of a TIQ market has the
added advantage of embracing heterogeneous EU conditions by exploiting the comparative
advantages of destination countries and allocating labor to where it is needed. While this is
theoretically a very convincing system, much more research needs to be done in order to
determine the initial allocation of quotas as well to better estimate the refugees’ relative rates of
destination country preferences. A greater knowledge of pull factors would highly benefit this
model and the proposed plan to initiate the redistribution of 160,000 refugees (WSJ, 2015) , as it
could allow the European Union to spread incoming refugees amongst countries with
socioeconomic characteristics most closely associated to those that are highly desirable to
refugees.
It is of dire importance that the European Union finds a common and diligent response to
the ever-mounting pressure of such an extreme inflow of asylum seekers, lest it falter and let the
foundational solidarity upon which it was constructed be succumbed by conflicting notions of
responsibility. In this regard, it would be highly beneficial for policymakers in the EU, as well
as all countries facing an influx of immigrants, to have a better understanding of the
socioeconomic characteristics that attract asylum seekers to particular destinations over others. I
hope to extend the existing literature evaluating asylum application distributions by
incorporating the methods found to be successful in previous studies into a comprehensive,
updated analysis using recently standardized data. While there will doubtlessly be difficulties in
the actual construction of my proposed regression model, the extensive literature examining the
subject of asylum application rate distributions will provide me with the necessary answers and
alternative methods to overcome those obstacles and build a theoretically sound and wellfunctioning model of the pull factor determinants of individual EU member state asylum
application rates.
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Data and Models
In evaluating the relative influences of destination country pull factors on monthly
asylum applications, my primary model will be a panel data fixed effects model in which I
include dummy variables for monthly fixed effects. This will allow my model to avoid biases
stemming from source country push factors in each time period that affect asylum applications
across all destination countries. While this method may be a less elegant way of controlling for
source country push factors when compared to the bilateral flows model, it should still provide
an accurate representation of the relative significance of included pull factors. Similarly, the fact
that I could only find annual data for some of my explanatory variables may lead me to lose
some accuracy in the estimations of my regression coefficients, although collapsing my data into
an annual format provides a nice check of robustness. All of my data over the time period of
2008-2014 was taken from the Eurostat database, with the exception of data for total airline
passengers, which was found in the World Bank database. Each of my explanatory variables is
lagged one year to account for the time delay in the spread of information.

Estimating Model

Yit= β0 + βj Xji(t-12)+

εit, where εit=

wt + vit

(Equation 1)

Where





Yit= Monthly asylum applications to countryi in montht
Xji(t-12)= A vector containing the ten explanatory variables, lagged by one year
Wt= Unobserved time fixed effects
Vit= Stochastic error term
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Table 1: Summary Statistics

VARIABLES
% Change in Construction Production
% Change in Manufacturing Production
Agricultural Production
Monthly Applications
Unemployment Rate
Income Per Capita
Refused at Border
Immigrant Pop.
Welfare Expenditure (% GDP)
Exterior Countries (10)
Interior Countries (18)
Total Air Passengers
Residence Permits
Number of Countries

(1)
N

(2)
Mean

(3)
SD

(4)
Min

(5)
Max

2,016
2,016
2,016
2,280
2,352
2,352
2,292
1,968
1,992
840
1,512
2,328
2,352

-4.680%
-0.877%
102.270
1,074.886
9.718%
25,408.163
14,679.450
1.8 million
24.549%
1.000
0.000
21 million
26,001.490

11.694%
8.494%
6.471
2,029.290
4.660%
10,663.743
57,083.883
2.7 million
6.109%
0.000
0.000
31 million
52,634.837

-48.300%
-25.400%
83.900
0.000
3.100%
11,000.000
0.000
30,474
13.000%
1.000
0.000
29,031
0.000

27.300%
22.500%
126.400
22,500.000
27.900%
73,000.000
510,010.000
10.2 million
38.200%
1.000
0.000
125 million
349,091.000

28

28

28

28

28

Highlighted in Table 1, the European Union is anything but homogenous in regards to the
characteristics included in my model. Comparing the minimum and maximum for monthly
applications as well as for my various explanatory variables emphasizes the disparate conditions
of each country. Likewise, while some variables may not change greatly over time within each
country, exploiting the large cross-country differences seen will allow me to test the influence of
each pull factor.

Dependent Variable

As my dependent variable I will be using the log of monthly asylum applications for each
EU-28 destination country over the years 2008-2014. Rather than normalizing monthly
applications by population, I included a variable for the annual population of each destination
country. As the monthly applications do not follow a normal distribution, I am taking a log to
smooth the distribution. To avoid time and seasonal biases that affect total asylum applications
to all countries, I will incorporate a monthly fixed effects estimator. While there has been a
strong increase in monthly applications for almost all countries observed in my model, the
14

persistent lack of convergence allows me to analyze what socioeconomic factors are driving this
disparity.

Figure 2
80000
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Figure 1 provides an example of the disparity in monthly asylum applications for six EU
countries. Figure 2 highlights the difference in asylum applications between interior region EU
countries and those on the exterior, as discussed in the explanation of my region variable below.
These graphs show that some destination countries do seem to be more attractive to asylum
seekers, with Figure 2 providing evidence that large numbers of asylum seekers seem to ignore
the standards set by the Dublin Regulation and are driven to journey further inwards in order to
apply for asylum at a more attractive destination.

Independent Variables

Starting with my independent variable capturing income opportunities, I will be using
countryi(t-12)’s log(GDP per capita), measured in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS). This allows
for cross-country comparisons by accounting for differences in the purchasing power of the
15
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different currencies used in my destination countries. As per capita income has been found to be
a significant pull factor in the previous literature (Neumayer, 2004; Thielemann, 2003), I expect
this variable to be statistically significant and to assert a positive influence on application rates.
In evaluating labor market conditions, I will be using the monthly unemployment rate of
countryi(t-12). As there has been large but unequal changes in EU unemployment rates across this
time period, this variable should give an accurate approximation of how asylum seekers respond
to changes in the labor market. While I am unsure how aware asylum seekers are of labor
market conditions, it is theoretically sound to assume the ease with which an asylum seeker
believes he will find a job should influence his decision, leading countryi’s unemployment rate to
put downward pressure on monthly application rates. Figure 3 shows that EU countries have
wide-ranging unemployment rates, and this difference likely plays a role in the destination
decision.
(Figure 3)
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Figure 3- Monthly unemployment rate graph highlighting persistent disparity in labor market
conditions

As a third measurement of destination country economic conditions, I am including a
variable for potential welfare benefits, measured as a percentage of GDP. Although countryi(t16

12)’s

welfare expenditure hasn’t been found to be statistically significant in previous studies

(Neumayer, 2004: De Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2009), I think it is wise to include a metric of social
protection expenditure from the updated Eurostat database. Asylum seekers are likely to need
some sort of government aid as they settle in their new country, and thus this variable should
exert a positive influence on monthly asylum application rates.
As a final estimator of economic pull factors I am using variables measuring the strength
of various production sectors found to be statistically significant in previous migration studies
(Jimenez-Jimenez, 2013). While she found that high rates of employment in both the agriculture
and construction sectors attract migrants, a greater reliance on the industrial sector was
associated with lower migration inflows. Although this was an analysis of total migration and
not solely asylum application, I expect the relative strengths of those sectors to exert a similar
influence.
In order to account for the effect of differences in the reception of asylum seekers on
application rates, I am including an annual variable measuring the logged number of migrants
refused at the border for countryi(t-12). Although I initially planned on including a variable
measuring each country’s asylum application rejection rate, I ran into endogeneity problems
between this rate and my dependent variable. By using a measurement of the number of
migrants refused at the border I hope to still capture the effect of differences in migrant reception
standards among my destination countries. The probability that an asylum applicant will be
allowed in and recognized should theoretically influence the decision of destination country, and
thus higher numbers of refusals should put downward pressure on monthly application rates.
In order to capture the effect existing immigrant populations have on asylum application
rates, I am including an annual variable measuring the logged number of non-EU immigrants for
each destination country. Commonly found to be the most significant pull factor on migration
inflows (Neumayer, 2004; Hatton, 2009; Thielemann, 2003), I expect network effects to exert a
highly positive influence on monthly asylum applications. This is theoretically sound, as having
a linkage of migrants from a source country facilitates a greater spreading of information, a
network of support, and a greater likelihood of familial connections.
While most of the focus on the plight of asylum seekers tends to be on those making the
dangerous journey across the Mediterranean Sea or through Turkey, there is likely a group of
seekers who were either able to afford a flight to their destination country or who were already
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temporarily residing in an EU country, and applied for asylum in order to avoid the danger of
returning to their source country. To test for the potential draw of a country being an easily
accessible air hub, I included an annual variable measuring the total number of aircraft
passengers for air carriers registered in each country. To test for the effect of temporary
residents in turn applying for asylum, I included a variable measuring the total number of threeto-eleven month temporary resident passes granted for work or education in each country. As
my explanatory variables are lagged by one year, all of these passes would be expired by the
time they are incorporated into my asylum application model, leading the permit holders to
pursue means of continuing to reside in EU destination countries.
Finally, in order to account for the geographical proximity of certain countries to the
common migration routes through the Mediterranean Sea and Turkey, I included a dummy
variable coded 1 for those EU countries in the exterior region and coded 0 for primarily
landlocked countries in which asylum seekers would have to travel through other EU countries in
order to apply for asylum. According to the Dublin Regulation, asylum seekers are supposed to
apply for asylum in the country they first step foot in, yet many asylum seekers pass through
those exterior countries in order to seek refuge in Northern European countries. This dummy
variable was also intended to serve a secondary purpose, as most of the Eastern European
countries asylum seekers would first pass through tend to be less wealthy when compared to
their Northwestern counterparts. It was hoped that the inclusion of this dummy variable would
then aid in a more accurate approximation of the influence of income opportunities on asylum
applications.

Interior Region Countries:
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary,
Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia,
Sweden, United Kingdom

Exterior Region Countries:
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Romania, Slovenia, Spain
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Results
As seen in Table 2, I ran my monthly application regression under three different
specifications to test for the consistency of my estimates. Table 3 shows these same models,
except my data is collapsed to annual figures in order to test the robustness of my results without
as much variation from factors such as seasonality. Column 1 shows my results for the Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) method of regression in which no fixed effects are controlled for. Column
2 shows the estimation results of my primary model as specified by Equation 1, in which
monthly fixed effects are controlled for. Finally, Column 3 shows my results for a model
controlling for both monthly fixed effects and time invariant country fixed effects. My
explanatory variables are lagged by one year in all model specifications.
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Table 2: Monthly Regression Results

VARIABLES

Log(Income Per Capita)
Welfare Expenditure (% GDP)
Unemployment Rate
% Change in Construction Production
% Change in Manufacturing Production
Agricultural Production
Log(Refused at Border)
Log(Immigrant Pop.)
Log(Residence Permits)
Log(Total Air Passengers)
Months
Region = 1

(1)
OLS

(2)
Time Fixed Effects

(3)
Time and Country Fixed
Effects

-0.822***
(0.169)
0.132***
(0.009)
-0.114***
(0.009)
0.016***
(0.003)
0.008**
(0.004)
0.004
(0.006)
-0.013
(0.026)
0.588***
(0.045)
0.079***
(0.018)
0.097***
(0.029)
0.014***
(0.002)
0.483***
(0.076)

-0.810
(0.556)
0.135***
(0.015)
-0.112***
(0.013)
0.016
(0.009)
0.016
(0.030)
0.007
(0.016)
-0.013
(0.050)
0.575***
(0.113)
0.085
(0.067)
0.099
(0.078)

3.349**
(1.445)
-0.021
(0.100)
0.051
(0.030)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.004
(0.007)
-0.004
(0.009)
0.141
(0.104)
-0.156
(1.346)
0.017
(0.032)
0.073
(0.183)

0.530***
(0.122)

Region = 1, omitted
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Number of Months
Number of Countries

-7.740***
(1.840)

0.704
(5.472)

-27.968
(19.340)

1,560
0.697

1,560
0.698
72

1,560
0.109
28

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

My Column 1 results show that before accounting for monthly fixed effects, ten
explanatory variables were found to be statistically significant, nine of which were found to be
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highly significant. While a majority of the coefficients for those variables found to be significant
exert influences as hypothesized, the variables for annual percent change in manufacturing
output and log of income per capita were found to go in the opposite direction. The income
variable is of particular surprise as it exerts a strongly negative influence even after accounting
for the poorer, exterior EU countries.
As seen in my Column 2 results, the majority of my explanatory variables lose
significance under my primary time fixed effects model. However, even after controlling for
monthly fixed effects, the variables of welfare expenditure as a percent of GDP, unemployment
rate, and log of existing immigrant population are all found to be highly significant and exert
influences as hypothesized. In agreement with the findings of Hatton (2009), Neumayer (2004),
and Thielemann (2003), a destination country’s existing immigrant population is the strongest
pull factor on the asylum application choice, with a 1% increase in immigrant population
associated with a .575% increase in monthly asylum applications, ceteris paribus. While found
to be more significant than in previous studies, the welfare expenditure and unemployment rate
of a potential destination country are theoretically plausible strong influencers on asylum
applications, as asylum seekers will likely need some sort of government aid upon arrival and
would also likely prefer a destination in which it is relatively easier to find work.
Lastly, Column 3 shows the results for my model in which both monthly fixed effects and
country fixed effects are controlled for. As seen in the R2 statistic, this model explains very little
of the variation in monthly asylum applications, and the variables previously found to be
statistically significant lose their significance. One possible explanation is that while the time
fixed effects model is comparing the influence of explanatory variables from a cross-section of
diverse countries in each time period, this model is attempting to make that comparison after
controlling for destination country characteristics already incorporated into the model. Also of
note is the log of income per capita variable, as it regains the significance lost in the time fixed
effects model and its coefficient changes signs. Suggesting that a 1% increase in destination
country income per capita is associated with a 3.35% increase in monthly asylum applications,
all else equal, this finding is more in line with the results of previous studies such as Mayda
(2005), Neumayer (2004), and Thielemann (2003). However, the fact that this variable changes
signs so extremely makes me question the validity of results from this particular specification.
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Seen below in Table 3, running my regressions with annual data yielded results similar to
those found in Table 2. However, the annual data produces more closely matched results
between the OLS and time fixed effects models, leading me to believe that the variables found to
be significant only in the monthly OLS regression are not very good indicators of true
significance. As welfare expenditure, unemployment rate, and existing immigrant population are
robust to changes in specification and keep their significance for both monthly and annual data in
OLS as well as time fixed effects models, I believe my results accurately indicate their strength
as pull factors. Once again, the time and country fixed effects model yields contrasting results to
my previous estimates. Perhaps incorporating country fixed effects into my model provides a
more accurate way of controlling for those included explanatory variables that change very little
for each country over time as well as any unobserved variables, and thus provides a more
accurate estimation of income opportunity effects.
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Table 3: Annual Regression Results

VARIABLES

Log(Income Per Capita)
Welfare Expenditure (% GDP)
Unemployment Rate
% Change in Construction Production
% Change in Manufacturing Production
Agricultural Production
Log(Refused at Border)
Log(Immigrant Population)
Log(Residence Permits)
Log(Total Air Passengers)
Year
Region = 1

(1)
OLS

(2)
Time Fixed Effects

(3)
Time and Country Fixed
Effects

-0.697
(0.499)
0.120***
(0.029)
-0.115***
(0.030)
0.018*
(0.010)
0.011
(0.013)
0.003
(0.019)
-0.045
(0.084)
0.570***
(0.149)
0.075
(0.060)
0.115
(0.096)
0.144*
(0.075)
0.588**
(0.257)

-0.674
(0.447)
0.122***
(0.014)
-0.114***
(0.015)
0.018
(0.009)
0.017
(0.028)
0.004
(0.017)
-0.046
(0.053)
0.564***
(0.099)
0.078
(0.067)
0.116
(0.071)

3.273**
(1.519)
-0.049
(0.101)
0.048
(0.033)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.007
(0.009)
-0.007
(0.008)
0.049
(0.092)
-0.605
(1.159)
0.021
(0.028)
0.089
(0.173)

0.622***
(0.104)

Region = 1, omitted
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Number of Years
Number of Countries

-286.402*
(151.195)

2.694
(4.536)

-17.236
(16.166)

134
0.712

134
0.710
6

134
0.199
28

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Conclusion
As indicated by my results and supported by previous findings, asylum seekers are indeed
aware of differences in destination country characteristics and these differences do play a role in
the asylum application choice. While the network effects resulting from a large existing
immigrant population undoubtedly lead to increases in asylum applications through the benefits
of increased connection, communication, and information, there is strong evidence that economic
conditions such as the labor market and the welfare state also affect the destination decision.
Once the decision to flee their home is made, asylum seekers take stock of and are influenced by
the relative likelihoods of finding employment as well as receiving support in the form of
government provided welfare benefits. The fact that these explanatory variables are both
statistically significant leads to potential insights into the motivations behind the asylum seeker
decision, such as having the need for welfare support yet having the desire to find gainful
employment. In addition, all three of the variables I found to have significant influence are
difficult for destination country governments to manipulate, suggesting the need to find
alternative policy measures rather than attempts to make a country relatively less attractive.
One potential solution to the disparate distribution of asylum applications is the
previously mentioned creation of an EU-wide market for tradable immigration quotas (TIQ’s) as
proposed by Moraga and Rapoport (2014). By internalizing the positive externality associated
with alleviating the massive, uneven burden faced by various EU member states, the EU could
reach a common solution while preserving foundational policies such as the Schengen
Agreement. Preserving a border-free travel zone would yield immense benefits to all EU
members, yet without a unified solution this crisis threatens to greatly exacerbate rising divisive
sentiment. My results show that the destination decision is largely based on unchangeable
factors, and unless the difficult crises in Syria and the Middle East radically improve, these
asylum trends will only continue to grow. Supported by previous findings such as Hatton
( 2004), this means that instead of searching for individualistic ways of dealing with this influx,
the EU needs to reach a rational solution that accurately reflects the existing conditions. By
imposing a system of TIQ’s, the EU could ease the mounting pressure faced by select member
states while simultaneously allocating asylum seekers to those countries with a comparative
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advantage in refugee reception and a need for increased labor. This system would provide
massive windfalls for both the EU and asylum seekers in desperate need of sanctuary.
An asylum seeker would not make the decision to embark on a difficult and very
dangerous journey, permanently leaving their home and past life, unless it was absolutely
necessary. The fact that they choose to confront harsh conditions and enlist the aid of traffickers
in order to trek into an unknowable future shows how desperate they are to escape the despair of
their homeland. It is understandable then, that after making this exhaustive journey an asylum
seeker would want to settle in a country that provides the most utility and opportunity. Based on
the results of my analysis, the most important factors playing into this decision are the existence
of network effects stemming from a large immigrant population, an easing of hardship in the
form of government provided welfare benefits, and the likelihood of finding gainful
employment. If the EU wants find a common solution to this crisis and halt the crumbling of its
foundational policies and institutions, it must come to terms with the large role these factors play
in the disproportionate distribution of asylum applicants. A solution to this crisis is of dire
importance for the displaced masses, the European Union, and global stability.
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